Left Gully

Hello, Marking this private because it doesn't really fit the format of this form but happy to resubmit as public and discuss the incident a bit more if desired. At about 11:00am on Sunday 12/8 my partner and I entered the base of Tuckerman Ravine and headed towards Left Gully with an objective of evaluating conditions along the way and skiing from no higher than the top of the main choke where there is a small ledge/transition area off to the left side of the boot pack. I spoke to a skier heading down who said he had skied half of Right Gully and saw a party heading up Left Gully. We skinned across the floor of the bowl through the branches to the base of the gully runout and began switch backing up the runout until about half way up where we switched to booting (see line in attached image for approximate approach) hugging the left side of the runout. We noted a solo skier coming up to the base of the mouth of the gully from the base of Chute but could not see below him to determine if he was truly alone so it was not clear if he was the party or was a part of the party heading up Left the descending skier had mentioned. At roughly 11:15am when we had reached location 'C' in the image(where the traditional boot pack comes in from the right across the mouth of the gully if you approach from beneath Chute) we were hit by an avalanche from above that knocked us over carrying us/causing us to slide ~60 vertical feet to point 'D' into the brush to the right of the main runout. My partner and I were both unharmed and covered in a couple inches of loose snow but were easily able to stand up and communicate with each other as we had ended up about 15 feet apart. Above us we noted people in the middle of the gully at location 'B' who were not there before the avalanche and the solo skier approaching from Chute had stopped below the mouth of the gully. My partner ended the slide higher up and headed up to confirm that the party above us was ok and no one had been buried while I retrieved my skis which had been ripped off my pack and ended up below me in the fall. I noted that the debris had slid about 1/3 of the way down the runout area beneath the gully proper. My partner determined that the solo skier we had seen to our right was alone and had not been involved in the slide. This skier decided to turn around and ski down the way he had come up at this point. The group above us had made their way to the looker's left side of the gully by the time we arrived at them and did not seem interested in discussing their experience as one was in a bit of a state of shock and eager to get out of the bowl. We were able to learn that as the group of three were booting up the final steep pitch before the lip of the gully an avalanche happened somewhere near point 'A' and had carried two of the three group members to point 'B'. The third group member had come down to meet the others (in boots) and the two carried skiers confirmed they were ok to ski out but 'had some bruises' with one skier having a visible bruise on his left temple above the end of his eyebrow. It was unclear if they had any other injuries. The group stated they thought the avalanche was natural and released above them. The group was not interested in discussing anything else and skied down to the floor of the bowl and down the TRT as we followed a bit behind before electing to walk down below the first aid cache instead of skiing like their party had. The 'Bottom Line' of the forecast for the weekend read: New snow and high winds could create dangerous avalanche conditions over the next several days. Avalanches could occur spontaneously or from the weight of a person. In steep ravines, watch out for smooth drifts of new snow and snow being blown by the wind as warning signs that avalanche conditions are dangerous. Poor visibility will limit your ability to safely assess the snowpack in steep terrain. This summary was spot on for what we found and all five of us got pretty darn lucky all things considered. Planning our day my partner and I discussed this summary, recent obs, and video of people triggering wind slabs in the bowl and noted that we were willingly taking a risk entering avalanche terrain and we would need to be cautious if we entered the bowl. We decided that given our experience with the terrain and conditions that this risk was acceptable, and we would mitigate it as best possible by evaluating the conditions as we went along, being willing to turn around if needed. We did not note any signs of instability on our approach although we did not conduct any formal snowpack assessment- opting for a few hand shears and jumps/stomps on small pockets of wind affected snow at the base of the gully runout which did not trigger any result. The high winds were certainly a factor in our decision not to stop for anything formal although we acknowledged that isolated wind slabs are highly variable and more evaluation would be needed as we climbed. The visibility in the bowl was limited to a few hundred feet at best which did not allow us to see the party above or any potential problem areas in the gully proper. I guess it doesn't actually matter because the outcome is the same but I was surprised that the group above us thought the avalanche was natural given it happened so close above them and only caught two of their three group members as they were all booting up. I imagine it was a wind slab triggered by one member of their party as the top of the gully becomes more open. A natural avalanche was certainly a possibility but the timing seemed curious/unlucky. We were hoping to discuss more with them but the group was not at HoJos when we arrived. I'm not sure how to wrap this up. We knowingly took a risk and it didn't 'pay off'. We were not able to control the other group or natural avalanche activity but we are able to control our presence in an area. One could certainly make the argument that we were too comfortable in the conditions. A familiarity with the conditions and area made us a bit more confident than we should have been given what the forecast summary actually conveys- if we were in a new zone we might have been more cautious and made a different decision about what to try and ski. In our debrief my partner and I discussed how we didn't necessarily regret all of the decisions we made before the incident. We noted that our failure to adjust to the increasing overhead hazard of approaching the gully played a significant role in the outcome and discussed how/if it could be mitigated in the future given similar weather and snow conditions. We are thankful to be ok and will take this as an opportunity to learn and plan better in future tours by taking more hazards into consideration with more care in routing and discussion of the conditions and whether or not an objective should be skied that day.

Left Gully

Quick report

Weather

Avalanche