Size 3 Remote trigger and rescue
North Columbia
stephen.slipp , Tuesday 12th March, 2024 6:00PM
The Incident: This incident was a remote triggered size 3 skier accidental avalanche on the persistent week layer (Feb 2 MFcr) with one skier involved that resulted in a ride through trees, partial burial, and surprisingly relatively minor injuries. The size of the avalanche and distance of propagation surprised the group. Overall the group was well trained, equipped, and experienced but above all they were incredibly fortunate given the size of the avalanche and number of trees in the path. Avalanche: At 10:13 am on March 11th the skiers (while skinning) believed they triggered the avalanche remotely from bellow and off to the side (one path over). They think a woomph from their steps travelled uphill 350-450 meters to the start zone. The group wasn’t able to access the crown safely but figure it was about a 1m crown on the known persistent weak layer (Feb 2nd) and it propagated 200m across two start zones that funnel down into one place. The start zone angle was approximately 34 degrees at an elevation of 2360m S-SE aspect. Only 1/8th of the available snow in the start zones slid and hang fire was of serious concern during the entire rescue. The vibration of the slide cause a sympathetic slide one ridge over. The group was 1/4 of the way up to the start zone so the slide was traveling very fast went it got to them; they had a few seconds to react and quick reaction may have prevented two from being involved. The weather was variable (a mix is snow, clouds, intermittent valley fog, and a few patch of blue sky); some solar radiation reached the slope just prior to the avalanche and could have been a factor. Play by play: Group of 5 skiers headed out from Meadow hut with the objective of skiing a triangle of dense trees with open paths on either side. They had skied several objectives in the area with little to no signs of instability in the days prior. They had dug pits on several aspects and had knowledge of various layers of concern. They began skinning up through the trees from Meadow hut and were about a quarter of the way up the ridge when they found they needed to cross one of the paths to gain the more mature tree band they were looking to ski. They separate and when one at a time. Three of the five of them had made it to the band of thick trees when they heard a massive woomph; all the trees on the ridge swung back and forth violently. Two skinners not yet in mature timbers looked up hill to see a large powder cloud coming down at them from several hundred meters above. The slide was wide and the safe zone they had identified amongst a cluster of trees on a micro ridge wasn’t safe enough. One of the two was able to run and made the mature band of trees just as the powder cloud hit, while the other was caught and taken for a several hundred meter ride through younger trees. The group imediatly announced the incident by radio to another group who was leaving the hut. The groups training kicked in and they began their search of the path. Three members stayed high to watch the path/ hang fire, while one member got a signal followed it and eventually heard yelling. From avalanche to confirmed airway was under two minutes which was impressive given that the partial burial site was several hundred meters bellow. The group member that went for a ride came to a final rest wrapped around a tree with his head above the snow. The group sent 2 more members down and dug him out and helped him move to the side of the slide path into some dense trees to access injuries. They coordinated with the group in the hut to bing a rescue toboggan, more layers, warm beverages, replacement skis &, skis, and more medical supplies. Another group at the hut situated themselves on a knob with a full view of the scene and hang fire. The team on scene wrapped the injured party with down and Mylar and built a fire while they accessed his injuries. Discussion about activating an inreach started within a minute of the avalanche but they held off once they heard yelling and again held off as the injured party seemed quite mobile as they undug him. Through radio to the group at the hut they reached out to a helicopter operator / search and rescue to notify them of the situation and ask them to be on standby. The injured party became signifcantly less mobile and in more pain as adrenaline wore off and the weather was deteriorating so the group made the call to ask for assistance from search and rescue. It was a difficult call to make as the injured party themselves was not for brining in external help. Given the size of the avalanche and the amount of trees internal injuries were of concern. A helicopter arrived at the same time as the group with supplies from the hut arrived. Everyone worked together to pack up the injured party and transport them to a place that the helicopter could land. The injured party was likely in the emergency room in a Golden within 2.5 hours of the avalanche and we've since learned did not break any bones; this was surprising as the force of the avalanche and trees had ripped the radio out of the injured party's jacket smashed it and broken both his ski boots. What went well: -Incredible communication: Everyone at the hut had a radio and knew how to use it. Groups had a habit of letting other groups know where they were at all times and any relevant observations. These habits led to efficient communication within the group of 4 on sevens during the avalanche and with the group in the hut / supporting rescue team. People worked together to ask questions and transfer information as needed; no egos or personality issues surfaces (as can sometimes arise in certain group dynamics) overall all remained calm and collected. -Group was well equipped and trained and this led to very fast companion rescue. The injured party was located, excavated and moved fast given the size of the slide and deposition zone. He was out of the path into safety within 5 mins. -The group of 5 was very well prepared for an emergency: (they had ample training, a saw, fire starter, layers, food, water, medical kits, and various forms of communication devices.) -The fire did provide heat but helped rescuers (from the hut) find them faster amounts the trees. Some areas for further reflection: -There was a safer but less efficient way to climb to the desired objective; in hind sight the group may have chosen to avoid as much exposure given the persistent weak layers. -one group member found a shoulder mounted radio mic didn’t work well during rescue as he was often a few post holes away from his bag/radio during digging and medical assessment etc and he will be putting a radio directly into his pocket moving forward. Note: Im writing this from an objective perspective on behalf of those involved I wasn’t there for the avalanche. I’m also writing it on my phone sorry for any typos
Source: Avalanche Canada MIN